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ADM-10.3

DD/S&T 5892/66

30 DEC 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

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ATTENTION :

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SUBJECT : IG Report Concerning Personnel  
and Document Controls

1. Your draft report concerning personnel and document controls has been reviewed by appropriate members of the DD/S&T.

2. This Directorate appreciates the need to clearly differentiate non-staff personnel who work in CIA buildings from staff employees and will cooperate with any badge program reforms introduced toward that end.

3. In the same vein, this Directorate will continue to encourage and support the Office of Security's position that individuals whose exposure to CIA buildings and assets is comparable to staff employees' should meet the same personnel security criteria as do staff employees. This seems to be the single most important safeguard built into the current system and should be maintained. In this connection, one error in the draft paper should be mentioned. On page 8, paragraph 2, the statement reading, "All non-staff personnel who have . . . Visitor-No-Escort (VNE) badges have an "A" security clearance . . ." is inaccurate. Only some VNE badge holders have staff-type clearances. The majority get VNE badges on the basis of clearance certifications provided by their parent organizations. The majority get VNE badges without polygraph testing. These people are, of course,

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visitors and their exposure to Agency assets should be markedly less than that afforded staffers.

4. It appears questionable that any badge system can function as a vehicle to effectively enforce the Agency need-to-know discipline. While a new badge system might better portray the holders' over-all status, i.e., staff vs non-staff, meeting or not full Agency Top Secret security standards including polygraph, etc., it will still be the responsibility of each Office, and indeed, each staff individual to dispense information with proper regard for need-to-know considerations. Perhaps to encourage the Office of Security to embark upon a rigorous reindoctrination program featuring the theme of compartmentation and need-to-know is in order.

5. One other general point will be made before commenting specifically on the recommendations. Page 9, paragraph 3b states, "The fact that if the Agency had wanted the employee to be staff and to be treated as staff, it would have hired him as staff is forgotten or never seriously considered." It has been the experience of this Directorate that the referenced statement has not always been the case. Actually, for a variety of reasons including personnel ceilings and budgetary considerations it often is not possible to hire as a staffer a particular wanted individual. Often the services of that same individual can be tapped via a contractual relationship of some sort to everyone's benefit.

6. IG Recommendations Regarding Availability of Classified Documents to Non-Staff Personnel

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The DD/S&T sponsors approximately [REDACTED] contract and non-Agency personnel whose document retrieval privileges are of concern here. Whereas the initial writeup of these recommendations suggested an extremely time-consuming and administratively burdensome program, the above recommendations could be adhered to by this Directorate if necessary.

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7. IG Recommendations re Badges and Restricted Areas

The question of the potential security gains to be realized from a new non-staff badge system must be analyzed by the Office of Security. Regardless of the configuration of a new non-staff badge program it must allow the same mobility to Contract Type A employees (of the kind that DD/S&T utilizes) as they now enjoy.

As to liaison personnel and visitors, it occurs that the existing arrangements involving the barriers of the "All-Source Center," the Office of Special Activities, etc., may already be capturing the goals of recommendations g and h. In all, the subject appears to require more research and discussion.

8. IG Recommendations re Career Agents

This Directorate would pose no objections to these recommendations.

9. IG Recommendations re DDP/RI Name Checks for all Former Staff Employees Who are Presently Employed as a Non-Staff Employee, Contract or Career Agent

This Directorate feels that such name checks should be accomplished by the Office of Security. The results of these name checks should be provided by the Office of Security to each Directorate and independent Office having interest in the individual.

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Acting Deputy Director  
for  
Science and Technology

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